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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DENISE AND LELAND STALEY,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. 050916251
vs,
CHRISTOPHER JOLLES & NORTHERN
UTAH HEALTHCARE CORP. dba ST.
MARK'S HOSPITAL,
Defendants.

The Plaintiffs have moved this Court to compel discovery and
ask leave to amend their Complaint, which motions were before the
Court for hearing on

October 18, 2007.

Having considered the

motions, memoranda, and argument submitted by the parties, the
Court enters the following order:
BACKGROUND
Defendant Christopher Jolles performed a hysterectomy upon
Plaintiff Denise Staley (the "Planitiff") on April 10, 2003.

The

Plaintiff was admitted to the post-operation wing ("Four West")
of Defendant St. Mark's Hospital (the "Defendant").l

The

Plaintiff alleges that during her first night in Four West, her
1

Defendant Christopher Jolles has neither opposed nor
supported the Plaintiffs' motions. As such, references to the
"Defendant" in this memorandum relate only to Northern Utah
Healthcare Corp.
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blood pressure dropped dramatically, causing severe kidney
damage.

She asserts that proper monitoring by the Defendant's

staff would have prevented this injury.
DISCUSSION
Two of the Plaintiff's motions are before the Court: a
motion to compel discovery and a motion for leave to amend her
complaint.

The Court will address each in turn.
A,

Motion to Compel

The Plaintiff moves this Court to compel discovery,
asserting that the Defendant has been dilatory in producing
documents and witnesses.

She specifically asks this Court to

compel the production of (1) complete personnel files of relevant
staff members, (2) documents relating to patient acuity, and (3)
four witnesses.

She also asks the Court to impose discovery

sanctions.
At oral argument the Defendant admitted that it was dilatory
in producing the documents and apologized for the delay.

It also

explained that some of the requested documents do not exist, and
therefore cannot be produced.

1. Personnel

Files

In April 2007, the Plaintiff sought production of the
personnel files for each staff member who cared for the

Staley v. Jolles
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Plaintiff. {See Certificate of Service, filed April 25, 2007;
Response to Fifth Set of Requests for Production of Documents,
filed May 11, 2007, attached at Plaintiff's Memo in Support, Ex.
D).

In May the Defendant objected to this request as overbroad,

but expressed that "it (was] willing to produce the requested
files . . . for those employees that Plaintiff identifies as
having breached the applicable standard of care in their
treatment of Plaintiff."

(Id.).

In preparation for depositions scheduled for Tuesday, July
31, 2007, the Plaintiff identified the nurses as the staff who
"were negligent in their care and treatment of plaintiff."
(Letter, July 13, 2007, attached at Plaintiff's Memo in Support,
Ex. E) . In response, the Defendant responded that none of the
Plaintiff's discovery requests sought "the personnel files for
the nurses in question" and invited the Plaintiff to make a
formal discovery request naming each nurse. (Letter, July 27,
2007, attached at Plaintiff's Memo in Support, Ex. F) . This
letter was faxed to the Plaintiff the Friday before the July 31
deposition.

The Plaintiff conducted the scheduled depositions

without the benefit of the deposed's personnel files.
In response to a more specific discovery request, the
Defendant produced personnel files for the nurses who were

Staley v. Jolles
deposed in July,
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However, it withheld several portions,

asserting they were not relevant and were privileged as "care
review" documents pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §26-25-1, et

seq.

At oral argument, the Defendant conceded that its objection under
the care review privilege was overbroad, and withdrew that
objection.

Instead, it objects to the production of any records

created after the incident as irrelevant.
The Plaintiff correctly notes that such evidence may indeed
be relevant.

For instance, evidence that staff neglected to

properly monitor other patients would bear directly on testimony
regarding that witness's care of the Plaintiff.
could also provide impeachment evidence.

The reports

In any case, even if

these documents would be inadmissible at trial, at the discovery
stage the Plaintiff is entitled to the production of any
information ''reasonably calculated "to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence."

Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

The Court orders the production of complete personnel files
for each staff member deposed on July 31,2 as well as the

2

According to the notice of deposition, the deposed staff
were Angela Stallings, Maelene Lee, Melissa Lewis, Robyn Phelps,
and Jennifer Nicholas.

4
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complete personnel files of the witnesses sought for deposition.3
The Defendant will produce these personnel files within thirty
(30) days of the entry of this Order.

Although the Court

anticipates full disclosure, if the Defendant asserts the care
review privilege with regard to any portion of the personnel
files, the materials must be presented to the Court for in

camera

inspection within twenty-one (21) days of the entry of this
order, or the Court will construe objection as having been
waived.

2.

Acuity

Documents

The Plaintiff complains that the Defendant has refused to
produce documents recording patient acuity for patients on Four
West on April 10, 11, and 12, 2003.

She contends that her

request for patient counts in January 2007 was broad enough to
obtain these documents.

In her July 13, 2007 letter, the

Plaintiff specifically requested patient acuity documents for
these dates.

After a discussion between counsel, the Plaintiff

filed a formal request reflecting this request. (See Response to

3

This includes Emily Pledger, How-Su Chen, Koco Henseler,
and Susan Clayton. The day before hearing this matter, the
Defendant identified Ms. Clayton as the charge nurse over Four
West from 7:00 am on April 11. The Defendant has represented to
the Court that Ms, Pledger's personnel file cannot be located,
but that it will produce the file if it is found.

5
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Plaintiff's Tenth Request, attached at Plaintiff's Reply, Ex. D).
The Defendant has explained that Four West does not keep
documentation regarding patient acuity, and that the only way to
extrapolate such information would be to produce the medical
files of each patient staying on Four West during the relevant
dates and attempt to develop an assessment from these.

Neither

party desires the production of these medical files.
The Plaintiff seeks an order for the Defendant to perform an
exhaustive search of its records for documents relating to
acuity.

She also has requested an evidentiary hearing in which

caretakers and staff would be questioned regarding the existence
of such materials.

The Court declines these invitations.

Instead, it orders the Defendant to review the medical files of
Four West patients on April 10, 11, and 12, 2003, and, if
possible, to draw together data regarding patient acuity and
produce a chart reflecting that data.

Such production will not

invade the privacy of the other patients, but will provide the
Plaintiff with the information needed to assess whether the
hospital was under-staffed on the dates in question.

The acuity

documentation will be produced within thirty (30) days of the
entry of this order.

If the documentation is not provided, then

within thirty (30) days of the entry of this order the Defendant

Staley v. Jolles
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must produce a succinct statement, made under oath by an
appropriate person, concerning how acuity is assessed and
communicated between staff on Four West.

3.

Witnesses

The Plaintiff has specifically asked this Court to order the
production of four witnesses for deposition: Emily Pledger, HowSu Chen, Emily Henseler, and Susan Clayton.

The Defendant shall

produce these witnesses for deposition within two weeks of the
production of their personnel files.

If their files cannot be

located, the Defendant shall produce the witnesses for deposition
within forty-four (44) days of the entry of this order.
The Court urges the Defendant to timely respond to the
Plaintiff's requests to set dates for depositions in this case.

4.

Sanctions

The Defendant has been dilatory in providing names,
witnesses, and documents in this case, and much of the requested
information was not provided to the Plaintiff until after she
filed motions to compel.

The Court orders the Defendant to pay

the reasonable attorney fees incurred by the Plaintiff in
bringing this motion to compel.

The Plaintiff shall submit an

affidavit pursuant to Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
limited to bringing and arguing the Motion to Compel.

Staley v. Jolles
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Motion for Leave to Amend

The Plaintiff asks this Court for leave to amend her
Complaint to include a charge of reckless indifference.

She

alleges that the Defendant intentionally understaffed Four West,
showing reckless indifference toward the safety of its patients.
Punitive damages are available in such cases.
During the deposition of CNA Maelene Lee, Ms. Lee testified
about under-staffing, complaints to management, and the
management's failure to provide more staff.

She further

testified that the high volume of patients was stressful.

The

Plaintiff seeks to amend her Complaint to include a charge of
reckless indifference, alleging that the Defendant intentionally
understaffed Four West for budgetary reasons.

The Plaintiff

cites a class action complaint filed in a Kansas federal district
court (the "Spires

Complaint"), in which the plaintiff alleges a

policy of understaffing.

This action was dismissed by the

district court, and the allegations have not been verified or
attested.

As such, the Court will not consider the

Spires

Complaint in making this determination.
Generally, when considering whether to grant a motion for
leave to amend, the Court considers three factors: timeliness,
justification, and prejudice.

See Jones

v. Salt

Lake

City

Corp.,

Staley v. Jolles
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ORDER
But the Court may also

consider any other factors relevant to the particular case,
including the futility of an amendment.

See Aurora

Servs.,

970 P. 2d 1273, 1282

Inc.

v. Liberty

West Dev.,

Inc.,

Credit

(Utah 1998).

1.

Timeliness,

Justification,

and

Prejudice

The Defendant complains that the amendment comes too late,
as fact discovery was scheduled to end last month.

As discussed

above, however, the Defendant's dilatory discovery tactics are
partially to blame for the Plaintiff's delay.

It cannot fairly

complain of timeliness when it has been dilatory in providing the
facts necessary to frame the claim.

The Plaintiff is also

justified in her delayed amendment, as the facts supporting the
claim only recently came to light.

In addition, the parties have

stipulated to a two-month extension of fact discovery. This
extension should counter any prejudice to the Defendant.

2.

Futility

of Amendment

Generally, "a court may deny a motion to amend as futile if
the proposed amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss."
Jenson

v.

IHC Hosps.,

Inc.,

2003 UT 51, 1139, 82 P.3d 1076.

Accepting the amended facts as true, the Court concludes that the
Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to

9

Staley v. Jolles
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To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the

Plaintiff must allege conduct manifesting "a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others."
Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1 (1) (a) (2007).

The Plaintiff alleges that

the Defendant intentionally understaffed its hospital to increase
its profits, knowingly putting its patients at risk, and that
this understaffing proximately caused the Plaintiff's injuries.
The Court is persuaded by the Plaintiff that such conduct, if
true, would constitute knowing and reckless indifference.
Beverly

Enterprises-Florida

Ct. App. 1995); Miller

v. Spilman,
v.

Levering

Reg'l

E.g.,

661 So.2d 867, 870 (Fla.
Health

202 S.W.3d 614, 617-18 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).

Care Ctr.,

LLC,

The Plaintiff's

amended claim would likely survive a motion to dismiss, and
therefore would not be futile.
The Court finds that justice requires that the Plaintiff be
4

The Defendant urges this Court to consider the evidence in
the record in making its determination, citing Pender v.
Bird,
224 P.2d 1057 (Utah 1950). In Pender, the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed a trial court's denial of a motion to amend because it
would not have prevailed in light of the evidence produced at
trial. Id. at 1059. The evidence considered by the Utah Supreme
Court was not limited to record evidence present when the Court
denied the motion. The Pender court essentially affirmed on
grounds of harmless error, and did not condone the consideration
of record evidence. The Court therefore declines the Defendant's
invitation to consider the pieces of evidence currently in the
record, and will instead follow the traditional standard in
considering a motion to dismiss, i.e. assuming the truth of
alleged facts.

10
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reckless indifference.
Although the Court will allow the amendment, it is wary that
the Pi a :i i itiff may seek broad discovery of conditions unrelated to
her stay in Four West.

The Plaintiff is admonished to narrowly

tailor her discovery requests to documents relating to staffing
conditions in Four West on or around the date she was admitted.
Similarly, the P.] a:i nti ff shoi i.3 d request on] y doci lmentati on. of
complaints going to conditions that would have rectified her
situation, not complaints of over-staffing in the hospital
generally.
C.

Discovery Extensions

In light of the preceding rulings, the Court will address
the various discovery deadlines which have passed and will soon
pass . The par t i es have s t ipul a ted t: :> a twc i i: toi iti I extei isi on D f
the fact discovery deadline, which was initially set for
September 28, 2007.

In addition, the Court will extend all

discovery and d i sposi t:i ve motion deadlines by sixty days

The

Court strikes t h e trial scheduled to begin on A p r i l 14, 2 008.
The Court's c a l e n d a r currently h a s o p e n i n g s large enough to
accommodate jury trial in this case in J u n e 2 008.
Court's calendar is f i l l i n g quickly.

However, the

T h e p a r t i e s should confer

and jointly contact t h e C o u r t ' s clerk, K a t h r y n Westwood, at

11

Staley v. Jolles
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1 • 1 I e C o i i1 t a n 11 c i p a t e s

that t h e s c h e d u l e d trial date will n o t b e disturbed again absent
a showing of c a u s e sufficient to justify another c o n t i n u a t i o n .
D.
w

P r o f e s s i o n a l i s m a n d Civility

[ T ] h e S t a n d a r d s o f Professionalism a n d Civility,

p r o m u l g a t e d b y t h e U t a h Supreme Court, u r g e lawyers to 'avoid
hostile/ d e m e a n i n g , o r humiliating w o r d s i n written a n d oral
communications with adversaries. '" Advanced
v.

Priskos,

Restoration

L L t\

2005 UT App 505, 537 n.13, 126 P.3d 786 (quoting Utah

Standards of Professionalism & Civility 3)

Nor shall an

attorney "without adequate factual basis, atti ibi ite to : tl ler
counsel .

improper motives, purpose, or conduct."

Standards of Professionalism & Civility 3.

"Credibility is often

directly tied to civility and professi onal ism."
Meadows Ranch Home Ass'n,

Utah

Peters

; • Pine

2007 UT 2, S[21, 151 P.3d 962.

The Standards also counsel attorneys "to consult with other
counsel so that depositions, hearings, and conferences are
scheduled at mutually convenient times."
Professionalism & Civility 15.

Utah Standards of

It also forbids lawyers to uuse

or oppose discovery for the purpose of harassment or to burden an
opponent with increased litigation expense."

Id. at I

tactics, while sometimes providing temporary advantage,

Such

Staley

3olles

PAGE 13

>W-

ultimately damage the attorney's reputation and credit;..ty with
the Court and other counsel.
"While these standards are not binding," the Utah Supreme
Court has "encourage [d] n lembers of t:l le 1: ar to sti i :iy a n d f ol ] <: ^
them,"

Peters, 2007 UT 2, 122.

Attorneys who disregard these

standards often harm their clients by doing so.

See id.

at 1 2 1 .

Th e Co i i. r t i: em i n d s co nil s e ] f o i t 1 i e p a r t i e s o f t h e s e St an d a r d s
and u r g e s their employment in all matters pertaining to this
case.
ORDER
Within thirty days of the entry of this order, the Defendant
shall deliver to the Plaintiff complete personnel files for each
witness w h o h a s been deposed or h a s been identified for
deposition.

It must also produce documents relating to patieiit

acuity o n April 10
patient files.

"'• , and 12, 2003, which it can collect from

In the event it cannot produce these documents,

it must produce evidence explaining h o w patient acuity is
assessed a n d communicated on Four W e s t .

A n y assertion of

privilege regarding these documents is waived unless made within
twenty-one days of the entry of this order.
Within fourteen days of the production of their complete
personnel files, the Defendant must produce How-Su Chen, Koco

Staley v. JoIJes
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Henseler, Susan Clayton, and Emily Pledger for deposition.

If

the personnel files of any of these individuals cannot be
located, the witnesses shall be presented for deposition within
six weeks from the entry of this order.
The Defendant is ordered to compensate the Plaintiff for her
reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing this motion.
Plaintiff si ia.1.3 sul >-.

rule 73 affidavi t

I J1 „ai R

i i"

The
f" 7 L

The Plaintiff is granted leave to file her First Amended
Complaint.
DATED this ^ ^ T day of October, 2 007.

14

I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, postage-paid, to the following:
DAVID B. CUTT
Attorney for Plaintiff
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RICHARD HONAKER
HONAKER LAW OFFICES
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 366
Rock Springs, WY 82902
MARK A. RIEKHOF
JENIFER RIES-BUNTAIN, Pro Hac Vice
Attorneys for Defendant Northern Utah Healthcare Corp.
136 East South Temple, Suite 2450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendant Christopher J. Jolles
P.O. Box 45678
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678

us22z
y

DATED thisC/

day of October,

2007.

M0>\

Court Clerk

15
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MARK A. RIEKHOF #8420
JENNIFER RJES-BUNTAIN, Pro Hoc Vice
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC
136 East South Temple, Suite 2450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 320-0900
Facsimile: (801) 320-0896
Attorneys for Northern Utah Healthcare Corporation, d/b/a St. Mark's Hospital

BEFORE THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNT
DENISE STALEY

ATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT OF HOW-SU CHEN IN
RESPONSE TO MEMORANDUM AND
DECISION ORDER OF OCTOBER 22,
2007

Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTOPHER JOLLES, M.D. and
NORTHERN UTAH HEALTHCARE
CORPORATION, d/b/a ST. MARK'S
HOSPITAL

Civil No.: 050916251
Hon. Judge Kate Toomey

Defendants.

C\ ** ^ i Chen, state that I have personal knowledge of all the facts in this Affidavit
ami ' called upon to testify, I could and would testify as follows:
1

•

'

\s Hospital. In that position, I am

responsible for day to day operations on the unit as well as staffing.

2

j | i a v e v^oj-^ed as a registered nurse for over 40 years and at St. Mark's Hospital for over

27 y*Mis.

3.

4W is a medical-sur^

nat takes patients that are stable enough not to require

1< 'I I en lelemrtTV monitoring.
4.'

I ha \ e beei I asked t : it e ' 'ri :rv tl ic n ledical files of 120 j ^atieiits admitted to 4W from April

10-12, 2003 and prepare a chart of acuity for purposes of assessing staffing.

5.

I was provided access to the patient's charts and have reviewed the staffing sheets from

April 10-12,2003.

6.

While at some institutions and on some floors, acuity is reduced to a numerical

expi ession of the con iplexit> of tl ic patient v e do not pi esentlj use such a system on 4W at St.
Mark's and did not use such a system in 2003. On 4W, acuity is not a number or a graph nor is it
the only factor that is considered in staffing. Rather, it is part of a continuing evaluation that
takes numerous factors into consideration. On 4\\ wi iln jml itvsigit each p i n uf ,i IUUIKH I i
code or create a specific chart of acuity; Additionally, patient's needs and demands on a nurse
i i m differ greatly even, w i 1:1 i ai i identical medical condition,

v

* ^-- :

•• v\ to create a chart or

code system, particularly years after the fact would be artificial and misleading.

2
45
17

7.

1 "he first evaluation of le\ el of care is an evaluation mi ide b) • the physician and applied

through the physician's orders Depending on the physician's determination, a patient will be
:

s S:UIH*'

•

'

••'

:

,-- .•»!.

-vNuri: '- A particular

level of monitoring may be ordered depending on the physician's medical assessment of that
patient. Post-operative patient's like Denise Staley are frequently assigned to 4W bj their
physicians.
8.

With respect to the determination for nurse staffing, acuity is primarily assessed in terms

of the particular patient's needs during a particular shift. This assessment involves a myriad of
• ai iables sue! i as the patient's overall condition (including the need for Q 0m pi ex technology and
equipment, wound/drain care, medication administration, pain level, vital signs, dependent care
needs, mobility, psychosocial/emotional status and family dynamics, to name a few) in addition
to the edi lcatioi i and si ;:ill mix of staff, ai noi lg othei ii icli v idi lalized factors. ' 11 lese facte i s can
change significantly from shift to shift. The primary source of information about these factors
for staffing is obtained from oral discussions with the patient's nursing care providers at the time
staffing is being assessed.
9

Staffing, or the assignment of certain patients to certain nurses, is a multi-factorial

process that begins with a count of the number of patients and reference to a staffing matrix
aM i e l <-d

>

i

-

.•

^

--,

, iw

t

certain number of patients. The patients are then assigned to tlle particular nurses for a given
shift as shown on the staffing sheet attached as Exhibit 2. In making the assignments, the

3

variables of patient's needs noted above are considered along with patient preferences, nurse
preferences, room location, past assignments and nurse availability among other variables that
may arise. Additional staffing options are always available should needs change even during a
shift. Staffing on the unit can be rearranged, other nurses can assist with a particular patient, an
on-call nurse can be summoned, nurses from other floors can assist and patients can be
transferred to other floors.
10.

I have reviewed the nurse staffing levels for the period of April 10-12, 2003 and note that

the number of nurses met or exceeded the hospital's guidelines for staffing. I have also reviewed
the charts of the patients assigned to Angela Stallings on the night shift of April 10-11. While it
is impossible to recreate the specific factors that would have led to the assignment of Ms.
Stallings to those specific patients, the condition of those patients was consistent with the
expected patients on 4W. Their assignment to Ms. Stallings was an appropriate staffing level for
a medical/surgical unit.

11.

I have also reviewed the CNA staffing for the period of April 10-12, 2003 and note that

the number of CNA's met the hospital's guidelines for staffing as well. The CNA's would have
been assigned to no more than 12 patients on the night shift and 9 patients on the day shift which
is an appropriate level for a medical/surgical unit.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

4
47
19

Verification
Under penalties as provided by the laws of the State of Utah, the undersigned certifies
that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct, except as to matters therein
stated to be on information and belief and as to such matters the undersigned certifies as
aforesaid that she verily believes the same to be true.

How-Su Clfaen
Director of 4W, St. Mark's Hospital
Subscribed and Sworn before me this Sll day of _

Afi ^(mijY\ 2007

iivyv^u

M&ftoO

NOTAR

££?15£ E L O P E Z GU-LANE
NOTARY PUBUC - STATE OF UTAH
139 E. SO TEMPl£, SUITE 300
SALT LAKE CfTY, UT 8411M128
My Comm. Exp. 02/23/2009

DATED this 21st day of November, 2007.

HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC

STARK A. RIEKBOF
Attorneys for Northern Utah Healthcare Corporation, d/b/a
St. Mark's Hospital

5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF HOW-SU
CHEN IN RESPONSE TO MEMORANDUM AND DECISION ORDER OF OCTOBER
22, 2007 was mailed, postage prepaid, this 21st day of November, 2007, to the following:

David A. Cutt
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST, P.C.

215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Elliott J. Williams
WILLIAMS & HUNT

257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Attorneys for Defendant Christopher J. Jolles, M.D.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

DENISE STALEY,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 050916251
vs.
CHRISTOPHER JOLLES, M.D., et al.
Defendants.

Defendant Northern Utah Healthcare Corporation has filed an objection to discovery,
and the Plaintiff has filed a motion to compel the production of medical records, which were
submitted for decision on February 22, 2008 and March 5, 2008, respectively.1 On April
18, 2008 the Court requested, and the parties have provided, additional briefing touching
upon the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and its role in this
case. The parties have requested a hearing, but the Court does not feel argument is
necessary to resolve the motions. Having considered the parties' arguments, the Court
enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order:

BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff alleges medical malpractice against the Defendants following a surgery
performed at St. Mark's Hospital, which is owned by Northern Utah Healthcare Corporation
(the "Defendant"). Following surgery, she was monitored on the Four West wing of St.
1

Defendant Christopher Jolles is not involved in these motions.
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Mark's. She alleges that her blood pressure dropped dramatically during her first night in
the hospital, causing kidney damage.
The Plaintiff previously filed a motion to compel the discovery of documents and
witnesses, which was heard by the Court on October 18, 2007, and upon which the Court
issued a decision on October 22, 2007. In that motion the Plaintiff sought, among other
things, any documents showing patient acuity for the occupants of Four West. Patient
acuity refers to the amount of care or monitoring a patient requires. Although such
documents are kept in many hospitals and in various circumstances, the Defendant
maintains that the nurses on Four West do not document acuity assessments. The
Plaintiffs amended complaint alleges that Four West was understaffed, which contributed
to her injuries. Patients with high acuity require more care, increasing the wing's staffing
needs. Thus, patient acuity is relevant to her claim.
In an attempt to avoid the disclosure of medical files, the Court ordered the
Defendant to review the medical files of the other patients staying at Four West and
produce a chart containing data related to patient acuity. (See Memorandum Decision and
Order, 10/22/07, at 6). In the event this chart could not be provided, the Defendant was
ordered to produce a statement discussing how patient acuity is assessed and
communicated between staff on Four West. (Id. at 6-7). The Defendant took the latter
course of action, producing the affidavit of How-Su Chen. ("Chen Aff.") (attached at
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Objection to Discovery Request, Ex. E). Ms.
Chen explains that staffing needs are assessed in terms of the patients' needs on a
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particular shift. {Id. at % 8). While acuity plays a role in these decisions, she is unable to
create a chart summarizing patient acuity because patient needs change from shift to shift
and cannot be recreated solely from the medical files. Id. Patient acuity is assessed and
communicated through oral discussions with the patient's care providers.
Ms. Chen's affidavit went somewhat beyond the scope of the Court's order,
however, further concluding that the number of nurses on duty exceeded the hospital's
guidelines for staffing, and that Ms. Angela Stallings, who cared for the Plaintiff, was given
an appropriate number of patients. (Id. at ^ 10). She made this assessment by reviewing
the six files of the patients in Ms. Stalling's care. Id.
DISCUSSION
The Plaintiff asks this Court to compel the production of redacted patient files for
those patients in Ms. Stallings's care. She contends that it would be unfair for Ms. Chen
to testify about acuity on the basis of medical files which have not been produced.
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery

" Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The

parties agree that patient acuity is relevant to the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant
intentionally overstaffed Four West. The Plaintiff has stipulated to receiving the records
with personally identifying information redacted, and under a protective order. Thus, the
only remaining question before the Court is whether the physician-patient privilege prohibits
the production of six non-party patients' medical records, with personally identifying
information redacted and subject to a protective order.
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Privilege

The physician-patient privilege is controlled by Rule 506, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 506(c), the Defendant is "presumed to have authority during
the life of the patient to claim the privilege on behalf of the patient." Utah R. Evid. 506(c).2
The privilege covers "diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given," as well as
"information obtained by examination of the patient and information transmitted among a
patient, a physician .. ., and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment
under the direction of the physician." Id. at 506(b).
The Plaintiff seeks medical records containing information described in Rule 506,
but seeks to avoid the privilege's application by having personal information redacted from
the medical files and subjecting the files to a protective order. Redaction, she asserts,
provides her with information regarding patient acuity while protecting the identity of the
patients. The Defendant disagrees, arguing that redaction does not adequately protect the
privacy interests of the non-party patients.
The parties' arguments require the Court to weigh the privacy rights of patients on
one hand against allowable discovery in a civil litigation on the other. This issue is one of
first impression in Utah, and the Court will seek guidance from our sister jurisdictions in
rendering its decision. The Defendant has presented four theories upon which it argues
the Court should prevent disclosure of the non-party patient files: (1) that the purposes of

2

The Plaintiff has not attempted to overcome this presumption. See Bums v.
Boyden, 2006 UT 14, H 26, 133 P.3d 370.

30
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the privilege necessarily protect any information compiled during treatment, regardless of
a threat of identification; (2) that the rule's plain language does not allow redaction; (3) that
redaction does not provide sufficient protection against identification; and (4) that the
documents are only marginally relevant to the case. The first three arguments lead to the
same conclusion: non-party medical files may not be produced in any form, in any case
involving third-parties. The fourth is limited to the facts of this case. The Court will address
each argument in turn.
1. Purpose and Scope of Physician-Patient Privilege
It is universally accepted that the intended purpose of the physician-patient privilege
is to protect the privacy rights of patients. The Defendant argues that the privilege should
extend to all information within a medical file, and that redaction does not render the
remainder of the file non-privileged. The Plaintiff contends that the privacy rights of
patients is adequately protected by redaction and protective orders.
From the Court's review of the cases, there appear to be two major schools of
thought in the consideration and application of the privilege. These schools differ in their
assessment of how far the privilege must extend in order to protect patient privacy. In one
school, which represents a clear majority of jurisdictions, the privilege extends only so far
as the patient could be identified through the records produced. E.g., Ziegler v. Super. Ct.
inandforCty, of Pima, 656 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. 1982), Under this school of thought, medical
records may be discovered by a third party, so long as information which could identify the
patient is redacted. Privilege laws are applied to prevent a party from establishing a
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connection between a patient's identity and information.
Under the second school, however, the medical information itself is sacrosanct.
E.g., Ortiz v Ikeda, No. 99C010-032-JTV, 2001 WL 660107, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 193
(Del. Super. Ct. 2001). No amount of redaction sufficiently protects the privacy of nonparty patients under this theory, and divulging any evaluation, diagnosis, or treatment
constitutes a violation of their privacy. Those who subscribe to this school of thought
prevent the production of any document produced in the course of a patient's care, unless
it falls within a specific exception under the statute or rule. A more detailed discussion of
both philosophies may be helpful.
a. Majority School of Thought
As Plaintiff notes, the majority of jurisdictions view the privilege as extending only
so far as there is a danger of identifying the patient. The California Supreme Court has
aptly summarized this philosophy;
The whole purpose of the privilege is to preclude the humiliation of the
patient that might follow disclosure of his ailments. Therefore if the
disclosure of the patient's name reveals nothing of any communication
concerning the patient's ailments, disclosure of the patient's name does not
violate the privilege. If, however, disclosure of the patient's name inevitably
in the context of such disclosure reveals the confidential information, namely
the ailments, then such disclosure violates the privilege. Conversely, if the
disclosure reveals the ailments but not the patient's identity, then such
disclosure would not appear to violate the privilege.
Rudnick v. Superior Court of Kern County, 144 Cal. Rptr. 603, 610 n. 13 (Cal. 1974)
(citation and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). In other words, the disclosure
of a patient's identity alone may violate the privilege if the context will reveal their condition
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or treatment. But records without personally identifying information are not subject to the
privilege because they essentially become the records of anonymous patients. One court
recognized that redacted medical records are fundamentally different from their unedited
counterparts. "[T]he search for truth may require the disclosure of redacted medical
records of nonparty patients even though the unedited records are protected by the
physician-patient privilege." Baptist Memorial Hospital-Union County v. Johnson, 754
So.2d 1165, 1169 (Miss. 2000).
In Ziegler, the court quoted a pronouncement of the privilege's purpose similar to
that embraced by our courts: " t h a t ' . . . the former patients are entitled to be left to their
privacy secure in the belief that their confidences, treatment, and records are protected
from disclosure.'" Ziegler, 656 P.2d at 1254 (citation omitted).

It noted that this

pronouncement "must be construed in context, i.e. disclosure of the identities of former
patients of the doctors." Id. (emphasis added). Because the order in Ziegler did not
require such disclosure, there was no betrayal of those patients' privacy interests. Another
court ruled that "[o]nce the information cannot be connected with the patient, the risk of
embarrassment that might lead a patient to withhold information from a physician and thus
interfere with proper treatment, as well as the risk of any invasion of personal privacy, is
eliminated." In re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation, 178 F. Supp. 2d 412,415 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
Additionally, these courts recognize that privacy and litigation interests are not the
only policies at issue in this debate. Disclosure of medical records increases transparency
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in medical care, giving providers additional incentives to provide proper training and care
for their patients. See e.g., Ziegler, 656 P.2d at 1255 (holding that disclosure "furthers the
public interest by insuring that hospitals will more scrupulously supervise the members of
their medical staffs and prevent exposure of future patients to medical incompetence.").
Numerous other courts protect patient privacy only to the extent necessary to
preserve anonymity. See Cochran v. St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 909 F. Supp. 641,
645 (W.D. Ark. 1995); Community Hosp. Ass'n v. District Court, 570 P.2d 243 (Colo. 1977);
Amente v. Newman, 653 So.2d 1030 (Ra. 1995); Terre Haute Regional Hospital, Inc. v.
Trueblood, 600 N.E.2d 1358, 1360-61 (Ind. 1992); Lester E. Cox Medical Center v. Keet,
678 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. 1984); Richards v. Kerlakian, 2005 Ohio 4414, H 5, 835 N.E.2d 768;
Tanzi v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 651 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1995).
b. Minority School of Thought
A few jurisdictions have taken a more resolute stance against the disclosure of any
information, regardless of the redaction of personally identifying information. This position
appears to have underpinnings in the constitutional right to privacy. See In re Columbia
Valley Regional Medical Center, 41 S.W.3d 797, 802 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001). In Ortiz v.
lkeda,1ot example, the trial court opined, "I am not persuaded that redaction of names
adequately protects a patient's legitimate expectation of privacy." 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS
193, at *4-5. And in Columbia Valley, the court specifically held that under its precedents,
the production of any portion of the patient's file constituted a breach of the constitutionally
protected zone of privacy. 41 S.W.3d at 802.

STALEY v. JOLLES

PAGE 9

ORDER

In essence, the position of these courts is that information given in confidence to a
doctor should never be produced in litigation to which they are not a party. Under this view,
allowing the production of redacted medical records "would mean that the patient's only
real privilege is that of having his name deleted before his intimate medical records are
interjected into a civil lawsuit without his knowledge or consent." Ortiz, 2001 Del. Super.
LEXIS 193, at *5.
c. Utah's Position
Our appellate courts have held that the purpose of the privilege is to encourage a
patient's full disclosure to a physician "in order to receive effective medical treatment, free
from the embarrassment and invasion of privacy that might result from the physician's
disclosure of the information." State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
"The privilege serves to alleviate patients' fear that their medical records could be disclosed
to the public and cause them embarrassment." Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, U 10,133
P.3d 370. Utah's courts are instructed not to "treat the policy underlying this privilege
lightly." Id.
Many of Utah's appellate decisions appear to align with the majority school of
thought because they focus primarily on preventing embarrassment to the patient. See
e.g., Burns, 2006 UT14,«[] 10; Anderson, 972 P.2d at 88. However, an adequate redaction
alleviates that concern because the patient is assured that the medical information cannot
be traced back to her. Moreover, in each of Utah's decisions addressing privilege, the
records sought would necessarily identify the patient, as they were parties to the lawsuit
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or crime victims. See Burns, 2006 UT.14, fl 5; State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, U 27, 982
P.2d 79; State v. Worthen, 2008 UT App 23, H 1,177 P-3d 664; Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT
App 58,1] 11, 999 P.2d 582; Anderson, 972 P.2d at 88.
The Court is persuaded by the majority position, which protects patients' privacy by
preventing their identification with the produced records, rather than imposing blanket
protection for each scrap of medical information created during a patient's care. In addition
to litigants' need for redacted files, the Court is persuaded that the potential disclosure of
redacted records will benefit the public interest by providing further incentives for medical
providers to properly train and supervise medical staff. The Court therefore rejects the
Defendant's request to interpret the privilege as absolutely preventing the disclosure of
non-identifying medical records.
2. Interpretation of Rule 506
The Defendant also argues that Rule 506 lists narrow exceptions, none of which
apply to this case.

Under Rule 506, certain exceptions to the privilege have been

enumerated, such as when a party requires the records as an element of his or her claim
or defense. The Defendant suggests that in the absence of a specific exception in the rule
allowing redacted medical files to be produced, the Court should not recognize one. This
is the ultimate conclusion of a few cases. E.g., Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital, 435
N.E.2d 140, 143 (III. Ct. App. 1982) (limiting the dissemination of any medical records to
the exceptions listed in the privilege statute); Davis v. American Home Products Corp., 982160, p. 8-9 (La,App. 4 Cir. 1/15/99), 727 So.2d 647 (holding that medical records do not
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"become exempt from the mandatory requirements of [statutes requiring patient consent]
by the redaction or removal of 'patient information'"); Columbia Valley, 41 S.W,3d at 800
(holding that rules did not "provide authority for [party]'s contention that redaction of
identifying information takes the records outside the scope of the nonparty's privilege.").3
Similarly, Rule 506 does not specifically mention redaction. However, "the effect of
. . . [a] privilege . . . [is to] close another window to the light of truth." State v. Godfrey, 598
P.2d 1325,1327 (Utah 1979); see also Utah R. Evid. 102 ("These rules shall be construed
. . . to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.").
Thus, "rule 506 should be strictly construed." Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, fl 17, 133
P.3d 370. In interpreting the Rule, the Court must refrain from stretching the canopy of
physician-patient privilege beyond its intended scope.
This does not mean that the Court may re-write the Rule to fit particular
circumstances. For instance, in Burns the State sought to inspect medical files connected
with allegedly fraudulent medical billing practices. 2006 UT 14, U 1. The Court rejected
two arguments proffered by the State which would allow the State to do so: one based on
a statutory exception, and one based upon a narrow interpretation of Rule 506. The Court
rejected the State's statutory argument that the privilege did not apply because providers
were required to release information or evidence to an insurer. See Bums, 2006 UT 14,

3

Although the Defendant lists Popp v. Crittenton Hospital as supporting its
position, Popp never addressed the issue of redaction; rather, it merely held that the
plaintiff was correctly denied a nonparty's medical records. It is unclear from the
opinion whether the issue of redaction was even considered.

37
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H 16; Utah Code Ann, § 31A-31-104(1)(b) (2003). The State alternatively argued that the
court "should construe the physician-patient privilege narrowly to create an exception for
investigations into suspected insurance fraud." Id. at H 17. Although it endorsed a narrow
construction of the rule, the Court declined to recognize a new exception to the privilege,
noting that the rule "contains only three explicit exceptions, none of which apply to this
situation." Id. at 1) 18. It noted that the Committee intended "that exceptions to the
privilege should be specifically enumerated," and that recognizing a blanket insurance
fraud exception "would be inconsistent with the intended effect of the rule." Id.
The Court finds Burns distinguishable, however, because that case did not deal with
redacted medical records. The State in Burns sought medical records in unredacted form,
and his patients' identities would be matched with their medical information. Thus,
although Burns endorsed a strict interpretation of 506 in applying exceptions, the Court is
not convinced that the same construction necessarily applies to medical files with personal
information redacted. This is because sufficient redaction and protection can remove the
records from the privilege entirely.
The Rezulin Products court analyzed a Texas statute with similar boundaries and
rejected an argument similar to the Defendant's. The language of the relevant rule
imposed privilege on records of "identity, diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of a patient."
178 F. Supp. 2d at 414. The court was unpersuaded by the conclusion argued by the
medical provider, "that any record containing a diagnosis, an evaluation or a treatment,
even if it cannot be connected with a patient, is privileged." Id. It reasoned that such a
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construction "would lead to preposterous results. A scrap of paper upon which a physician
had jotted down a patient's name, or wrote only the word Indigestion1 (a diagnosis) or
'aspirin' (a treatment) or 'malingering' (an evaluation) would, or at least could, be
privileged." Id. Instead, the Court considered the overall purpose of the rule, which is to
prevent the disclosure of "highly personal information." Id. at 415. It reasoned that the
removal of personally identifying information would simultaneously remove the records
from the shield of the physician-patient privilege. Id.
The Court is persuaded by the reasoning in Rezulin Products. Although Rule 506(b)
lists "diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given," its scope is necessarily limited
by its purpose: to prevent the disclosure of information which can connect that information
to the patient. It would not lead to embarrassment if a doctor is known to have made a
particular diagnosis, performed a particular treatment, or given particular advice. The
Court concludes that redacted medical files are not subject to the privilege's bar, so long
as proper protective measures are in place to prevent the further dissemination of the
discovered materials.
3. Adequate Protection Against Identification
The underlying premise of the majority position on redacted files is that patient
identification will be made impossible through redaction. However, at least one court has
denied access to redacted medical information based upon fears that redaction would be
inadequate to protect patients1 identities. In Parkson, the plaintiff argued that redaction
would avoid a violation of physician-patient privilege. 435 N.E.2d at143. The Court
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rejected this argument, reasoning that "[wjhether the patients' identities would remain
confidential by the exclusion of their names and identifying numbers is questionable at
best," Id. at 144. It explained that the "discharge summaries arguably contain histories of
the patients' prior and present medical conditions, information that in the cumulative can
make the possibility of recognition very high." Id.
The Court is unpersuaded by this speculative argument because it excludes medical
files without allowing the court to assess the specific circumstances of each case and
determine whether there is any probable threat that identity will be linked to a file. In
support of its reasoning, the Parkson court cited Doe v. Roe, a case in which a psychiatrist
published a book detailing his conversations with a patient over many years, including
stories of the patient's life history and intimate details of his marriage as it dissolved. 400
N.Y.S.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977). This is an extreme example, and one taken out
of context. First, redaction of personally identifying information is not necessarily limited
to the name and address of the patient, but could include eliminating references to other
personally identifying information, such as locations of family, employment, and accounts
of particularly unique or well-known life events.4

Second, unlike Doe, where the

psychiatrist published a book detailing his patient's private information, the discovered
materials in this lawsuit would be subject to a protective order preventing their
dissemination beyond their use in the lawsuit, and requiring their return upon the

4

For example, a narrative of the cause of injury, if unique or widely publicized,
could be sufficiently redacted to prevent identification.
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conclusion of the case.
The employment of a protective order is particularly important to preventing patient
identification. Numerous courts have held that protective orders are necessary when
redacted medical records are produced in litigation. In Bennett v. Fieser, a plaintiff sought
the medical file of a burn patient whose arrival allegedly diverted a doctor from caring for
the plaintiff. 152 F.R.D. 641, 642 (D. Kan. 1994). Although the plaintiff in that case agreed
that identifying information could be redacted, he also stated that he would attempt to
contact that patient and call him as a fact witness. Id. The Court first determined that the
privilege would not apply due to the record's redaction, and specifically addressed the
argument raised in Parkson. It recognized that in some situations, "providing medical
records with names and identifying information removed could nonetheless provide vital
clues which would assist a party in identifying the non-party patient." Id. at 643. It found
that an adequate remedy for this problem was an order "that the parties and counsel shall
make no effort to learn the identity of the patient or attempt to contact the patient." Id.
Other courts have approved similar protective orders. See In re The American Tobacco
Co., 880 F.2d 1520,1530 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming imposition of protective order requiring
redaction of names, street addresses, towns or villages, social security numbers,
employers, and union registration numbers); Richards, 2005 Ohio 4414, U 8 (requiring
court to craft protective order to protect against "indiscriminate dissemination" of redacted
medical records).
The Court concludes that a protective order which limits the medical records to
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review only by counsel and experts, and prevents any party from attempting to discover the
identity of the patient or contact the patient, sufficiently guards against the remote
possibility that the information will provide clues to the patient's identity. The Court rejects
the argument proffered by Parkson, which would apply an absolute bar regardless of the
circumstances of the particular case.
4. Circumstances of this Case
In its reply memorandum, the Defendant argued that the need to protect patient
privacy, even if not requiring a blanket prohibition of disclosure, is not outweighed by the
Plaintiffs need for the medical records in this case. It relies principally upon In re Christus
Health Southeast Texas, a Texas Court of Appeals case in which a plaintiff sought nonparty medical records to demonstrate that patients with lower acuity were allowed to remain
in an emergency room while she was turned away. 167 S.W.3d 596, 598 (Tex. Ct. App.
2005). As in this case, the parties agreed that the information was relevant to the plaintiff's
claim, but the hospital argued that the privacy rights of its patients should not be overcome
merely upon a showing of relevance. The court agreed, explaining that '"relevance alone
cannot be the test, because such a test would ignore the fundamental purpose of
evidentiary privileges, which is to preclude discovery and admission of relevant evidence
under prescribed circumstances.'" Id. at 602 (quoting R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836,
842 (Tex. 1994)). The Ramirez court previously held:
Communications and records should not be subject to discovery if the
patient's condition is merely an evidentiary or intermediate issue of fact,
rather than an 'ultimate' issue for a claim or defense, or if the condition is
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merely tangential to a claim rather than 'central' to it
887 S. W.2d at 842-43. The Christus Health court remanded to the trial court to determine
whether the records were merely intermediate issues of fact, or whether they related to the
ultimate issue of her claim. 167 S.W.3d at 603.
Other courts have required the courts to make decisions regarding privilege on a
case-by-case basis, weighing the relevance of the requested documents against the
privacy interests. See Wilfong v. Shaeperkoetter, 933 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Mo. 1996) ("The
circumstances, facts and interests of justice determine the applicability of the physicianpatient privilege to a particular situation."') (citation omitted). For instance, in Richards v.
Kerlakian, the plaintiff sought redacted non-party medical records to prosecute its claim for
negligent credentialing. 835 N.E.2d 768, 768 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). The Court concluded
that the records must be produced because they were necessary "to develop a primary
claim" against the hospital. Id. at 770. The Richards court noted that it was "difficult to
imagine how else the negligent-credentialing claim could have been investigated without
the disputed documents." Id.
The Court concludes that it should weigh the need for the non-party medical records
against the privacy concerns of the patients when considering whether to order the
disclosure of those records. When the records are only slightly relevant, such as those to
be used solely as impeachment evidence, disclosure may be inappropriate. But when the
records represent important evidence in support of a claim, their disclosure in redacted
form is more appropriate. The Rules emphasize the importance of the medical records to
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the case itself in determining whether the privilege exists. See Utah R. Evid. 506(d)(1).
In addition, the Court will address any concerns that a patient could be identified despite
redaction.
On the side of discovery, the Plaintiff seeks records which will essentially be
rendered anonymous, for the limited purpose of assessing whether the nurse caring for
those patients was overextended. Due to the hospital's policy of not keeping a nonconfidential record of patient acuity, reference to the medical records appears to be the
only way for an expert to assess acuity. Patient acuity is a key component to the Plaintiff's
claim of gross negligence. This weighs in favor of disclosure.
Of course, the question of patient acuity is only a part of the Plaintiffs claim for
gross negligence, and reference to the medical records are not the only basis upon which
the Plaintiff could present evidence of such negligence. This makes the Plaintiffs need
for the medical records slightly less compelling.
The Defendant contends that "in such a case as this which involves multiple
members of the same relatively small community," redacted medical files may not
adequately protect patient confidentiality.

This argument would apply in certain

circumstances. For instance, the Rezulin court recounted the facts underlying a Texas
Court of Appeals case in which the court declined to release redacted medical files when
the non-party patient was a "long time resident'" of Goliad County, Texas and the request
related to the care of males in a particular nursing home. 178 F. Supp. 2d at 415 (quoting
In re Diversicare General Pamter, Inc., 41 S.W.3d 788, 795 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001)). The
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Rezulin court noted that the male population of Goliad County had only 533 members over
the age of sixty-five, and that a smaller number of those men would have received care in
a nursing home. Id. (citing 2000 United States Census). It distinguished Diversicare
because the facts underlying the Rezulin case did not have similar implications. Like the
Rezulin court, this Court could envision similar circumstances in some care facilities, such
as those in Utah's rural communities, in which the disclosure of redacted files to local
attorneys and experts would not adequately protect against patient identification.
But those are not the facts of this case. Although Utah is not overwhelmingly
populous state when compared to others, the 2000 census showed that nearly 900,000
people resided in Salt Lake County alone.5 This renders the potential for identification from
redacted records highly improbable. In addition, as one of the few large hospitals in the
region, St. Mark's provides facilities for residents of neighboring counties and states,
increasing the potential pool of patients. Moreover, the medical records requested in this
case relate solely to a surgical recovery wing; a patient's presence on that wing does not
imply any particular type of surgery or ailment. While the Court concludes that it is
appropriate to consider the risk of identification from redacted medical files, it finds that
there are no such concerns in this case.
Given that the privacy of the non-party patients will be adequately protected by

5

See U.S. Bureau of Census, DP-1 Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics: 2000, Data Set: Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1) and Summary
File 3 (SF 3), available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/49/49035.html.
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redaction and a protective order, and considering the Plaintiff's need for the records, the
Court finds it necessary for the Defendant to disclose the records of the six patients for
whom Ms. Stallings provided care. These records will be redacted and subject to a
protective order which restricts review of the medical files to attorneys6 and expert
witnesses, prohibiting them from using or disclosing those records outside of litigation, and
requiring the return of those records at the conclusion of the litigation.7
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
6

By this, the Court emphasizes its intent to limit review to attorneys involved in
this case; paralegals and other support staff will not be permitted to assist in preparing
or reviewing the redacted medical files.
7

The protective order in this case should satisfy the requirements of HIPAA,
which mandates a "qualified protective order" which prohibits a party from using or
disclosing the information for any purpose other than the litigation and requiring the
return or destruction of the medical records at the end of the proceedings. See 45
C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(2)(v)(A) and (B).
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ORDER
The Court overrules the Defendant's objection to discovery, and grants the Plaintiffs
motion to compel production. The Defendant shall produce the medical files of the six
patients for whom Ms. Stallings provided care, and which formed the basis of Ms. Chen's
opinion. The Defendant shall redact personally identifying information from the copies
provided. These medical records shall be subject to a protective order which limits their
dissemination to counsel and experts, and shall be returned to the Defendants at the
conclusion of this case.

DATED thisifL day of May, 2008.
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